Technological sovereignty: should you impose purchases as China does?

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The announcement of a record investment of $ 100 billion by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) in the United States illustrates the American desire to reduce its dependence to Asian manufacturers. Europe follows a similar trajectory with its Chips Act and its 43 billion euros intended to structure a local semiconductor industry. But beyond the displayed ambition, an essential question remains: How to guarantee the profitability of these infrastructure if local businesses continue to stock up in Asia?

Chinese strategy may well inspire Europe and North America. In addition to massively subsidizing its semiconductor industry, Pekin requires national companies to buy an increasing share of their production from Chinese players. This model allows him to Secure local demandto accelerate the skill rise of its manufacturers and to structure an integrated ecosystem. By guaranteeing a sufficient volume of orders, it reduces its dependence on TSMC and Samsung, while consolidating its technological autonomy.



The United States and Europe, attached to the principles of the open market, are still hesitant to impose such constraints. However, producing semiconductors in Europe and North America costs 30 to 50 % more expensive that in Asia. In addition to much higher wages than in Taiwan or in South Korea, infrastructure requires colossal investmentsamplified by strict environmental standards. With a much less integrated supply chain than in Asia, costs are constantly increasing. Nothing guarantees that manufacturers like Apple, Nvidia or Qualcomm will favor American Fabs if no strong incentive pushes them.

If the Trump administration applies a 25 % tax on imports of semiconductors To make local production more attractive, nothing says that it will be enough to fill the competitiveness gap with Asia. Such a measure is also likely to Climb the price of technological productspenalizing manufacturers of smartphones, data centers or electric vehicles. Europe, faced with the same challenges, sees Intel and TSMC Investing in Germanywithout imposing European manufacturers to buy locally. If the Chips Act stimulates production, it does not offer No clear mechanism to structure demand. At this rate, these factories are likely to be only monuments of unfinished ambition.

Faced with the Chinese example, a more proactive industrial policy seems inevitable If North Europe and America want to make these projects profitable. Otherwise, the infrastructure will be underused, despite billions invested. The alternative to purchasing quotas could be a combination of tax credits, targeted grants and guaranteed public contractsespecially in strategic sectors such as defense or the Cloud infrastructure.

Times change. The time to copy China may have come.