Talking about defense innovation in France is a perilous exercise. The Tech ecosystem sees it as a undermined land, the public debate combines industrial commitment and bellicism, and the state apparatus remains frozen in a mechanical of heavy tenders and investments planned at ten years.
However, at a time when conflicts are intensifying at the borders of Europe, obviousness is essential: our industrial defense model no longer responds to the strategic emergency or the rhythm of technological innovation.
The American previous: when startups take over from the Pentagon
In the United States, Palmer Luckey, founder of Oculus, launched Andundil With the idea of building defense systems as we build tech products. Delivered quickly, finance in private capital, to emancipate from the military budget cycle.
Result ? In less than ten years, Andundil deploys autonomous drones, AI surveillance towers, anti-mealing systems and combat micro-games … without going through conventional tenders. She has just resumed Microsoft an IVAS contract at $ 22 billion to equip American soldiers with an augmented vision.
The model changes. We are no longer talking about “contractors” but “product companies”. These are companies that invest Before to be selected, which assume the risk produced, and which deliver ready -to -use solutions – long before the bureaucracy loops its consultation.
And France, in all of this?
We continue to think of defense as an industrial cathedral, reserved for a few large houses: Thales, Safran, Dassault, Knds … A model that has its merits, but which struggles to meet the current speed, modularity and software integration requirements.
Three major blockages prevent the emergence of a French Andundil:
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- A dependence on the budgetary cycles of the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
- Delivery times incompatible with contemporary threats.
- A persistent chilling of investors in the face of so -called “sovereign” subjects.
And yet, The conditions are met. France has high -level engineers, a fertile deeptech fabric, a solid industrial defense base. The Define Innovation Agency (AID) and the Definvest fund are positive signals, but insufficient to date to trigger a real strategic productivity shock.
What is we missing? A doctrine.
We need startups ready to assume the risk. And a state ready to accompany them without locking them up. This implies three concrete ruptures:
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- Reverse the logic of the need expressed. Design interoperable products upstream, capable of sending identified tactical uses (drone detection, electronic war, cybersecurity in the field).
- Normalize investment in dual technologies. Defense should no longer be a taboo for VC funds. It is time to recognize that an autonomous drone is no less ethical than an advertising algorithm.
- Accelerate access to public contracts. The DGA must be able to contract faster on ready -to -use products, drawing inspiration from the “Fast Track” approaches to the American IUD.
The stake is not just industrial. It is geopolitical.
In a fragmented, rearmed, accelerated world, technological sovereignty cannot be decreed – it is built. And it is built at the speed of engineers, not that of procedures.
If France wants to weigh in the strategic competition of the next decades, it will have to accept that its future Defense champions will sometimes carry hoodies, will work on short cycles, will quickly prototy, will have it without delay validation. It will also have to assume that military autonomy cannot be based solely on an industrial base of the last century.
Defense innovation is no longer a state monopoly. It is an ecosystem issue. And like any ecosystem, he will only survive if he knows how to attract talents, mobilize capital, and deliver quickly.
