Donald Trump signed two Executive Orders yesterday which mark a new stage in American technological strategy. The first sets an ambitious industrial goal: to accelerate the development of a quantum computer capable of carrying out useful scientific research by 2028, by mobilizing federal agencies, national laboratories and private industry.
The second aims to prepare the United States for the arrival of quantum decryption capabilities likely to make current cryptography mechanisms obsolete. In particular, it brings forward the deadline for transition to infrastructures resistant to quantum attacks from 2035 to 2031 and asks administrations to strengthen the protection of critical infrastructures as a priority.
Behind these announcements lies a double ambition: to maintain the American lead in a technology considered strategic for the next decade and to anticipate the security consequences of an upheaval which could call into question the very foundations of modern cybersecurity.
Of course the objective of having a quantum computer capable of producing concrete scientific results by 2028 is the most understandable priority, the announcement takes place in a context of intense technological competition. Private investments now number in the billions of dollars. The laboratories of IBM, Google, Microsoft, Quantinuum and PsiQuantum are making further advances. France is not left out, as Sabine Mehr du Genci reminded us on our set. Financial markets are speculating on the emergence of a new computing platform that could ultimately succeed traditional architectures.
However, the weak signal is found in a second, much less commented on decree, by which the White House advances by four years the timetable for transition to post-quantum cryptography. Federal administrations will now have to be protected against quantum threats by 2031, compared to 2035 previously.
This acceleration reflects a major evolution in American strategic reasoning. For Washington, the quantum threat no longer belongs to the future. It is already acting in the present, and its name is now well known to intelligence agencies: “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later”.
The day when time became the attacker’s ally
For decades, cybersecurity has been based on a relatively simple hypothesis: a cryptographic system is considered secure as long as no machine has the power necessary to break it, and this is where the downside hurts, quantum turns this logic on its head.
The “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” scenario is based on an idea of disconcerting simplicity. An attacker does not need to be able to decipher information today for it to be useful tomorrow. So he just needs to steal it.
Diplomatic communications, industrial data, military plans, research results, government archives or medical information can be intercepted now, stored for several years and then deciphered when quantum capabilities allow.
The attack then becomes a long-term investment.
After focusing on protecting data in transit or preventing intrusions. Quantum introduces a new variable in cybersecurity: the strategic lifespan of information. Data is no longer just sensitive today, it can remain sensitive for fifteen or twenty years.
An invisible but already active threat
This perspective profoundly modifies risk analysis. Public discussions around quantum often focus on one question: When will the first computer capable of breaking RSA or the elliptic curve encryption systems that protect much of the Internet today appear?
American agencies are now asking themselves another question: how much data is already being collected in anticipation of this event? Today the answer is unknown, but storage capacities have never been so abundant. Cloud infrastructures make it possible to store gigantic volumes of data at decreasing costs. States have considerable resources to conduct large-scale collection operations.
In this context, technological uncertainty ceases to be reassuring because even if the quantum computer capable of breaking current cryptographic systems only arrives in ten years, the data stolen today can still be exploited.
The danger is therefore no longer correlated to the arrival date of the machine, but to the future value of the information that is currently protected.
The most exposed sectors are not those we think
Not all data poses the same level of risk. A one-off business transaction or marketing campaign quickly loses its value. On the other hand, certain categories of information retain exceptional strategic importance over long periods of time.
Defense is the first obvious example; military infrastructure plans, operational capabilities, command systems or sensitive research programs may remain relevant for several decades.
The pharmaceutical sector faces a similar problem; clinical data, manufacturing processes or research results represent years of investment and can retain considerable economic value long after their creation.
Energy infrastructure is another critical case. Power grids, industrial control systems or energy distribution architectures are designed to operate over time horizons of several decades.
The financial sector is no longer spared. Large banking institutions retain considerable volumes of regulatory, contractual and transactional data, some of which will have to remain confidential well beyond 2035.
Even health data takes on a special dimension in a post-quantum world, because unlike a password, genetic or biometric information cannot be modified when it is compromised.
Why Washington is suddenly accelerating
The acceleration of the American timetable is probably the most revealing part of the White House announcements. The Biden administration had set a 2035 goal of migrating to infrastructures resistant to quantum attacks. Donald Trump now brings this deadline back to 2031.
This change does not necessarily reflect an imminent technological breakthrough, but above all reveals an evolution in risk management.
National security officials do not know precisely when a quantum computer capable of breaking the world’s major cryptographic standards will emerge. They do, however, know that research programs are progressing more quickly than five years ago. They also know that a statewide crypto migration often takes a decade.
Waiting for technological certainty would therefore mean acting too late.
The reasoning is comparable to that which led the United States to secure its semiconductor supply chains before a major crisis occurred. The objective is not to respond to a proven threat but to reduce a strategic vulnerability before it becomes critical.
Quantum joins AI in the hierarchy of sovereign technologies
This sequence also marks a political change; for three years, artificial intelligence has monopolized the attention of governments, investors and manufacturers. The debates focus on models, data centers, energy or chips.
Quantum now joins this restricted circle of technologies considered decisive for national power. The United States is simultaneously investing in semiconductors, AI, sovereign cloud, energy infrastructure and quantum. These technologies are now seen as different layers of the same strategic architecture.
The goal is not just to maintain scientific leadership, but to control the computational infrastructures that will determine economic competitiveness, military superiority, and national security over the coming decades.
This logic also explains the growing attention to quantum sensors, also mentioned in presidential executive orders. Long before universal quantum computers, these technologies could transform navigation, detection or military operations in environments where GPS is jammed or unavailable.
A new data-driven arms race
The Cold War was based on the accumulation of missiles, nuclear submarines and satellites. The technological competition of the 21st century is increasingly based on the accumulation of data, computing power and algorithmic capabilities.
The “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” scenario adds an additional dimension to this logic.
In this new context, a database becomes a strategic asset comparable to an energy reserve or a critical infrastructure, where the value no longer resides only in the information itself, but in the future capacity to exploit it.
This development profoundly transforms the notion of digital sovereignty. The question is no longer just where the data is stored, but who will be able to read it in ten or fifteen years?
The real message sent by Washington
The Executive Orders signed by Donald Trump do not only constitute additional support for an emerging industry. For the White House, quantum is becoming a subject of infrastructure, national security and sovereignty.
For decades, cybersecurity has been about protecting the present, the post-quantum era now requires organizations to protect the future.
