The semiconductor war has long been told through the names of NVIDIA, TSMC, Intel or Huawei. However, the most strategic enterprise in this confrontation is neither American nor Chinese but European.
For several weeks, the Trump administration has been raising questions about ASML after suspicions concerning the possible presence of an EUV lithography system in China. The company claims that no machine of this type has ever been exported to Chinese territory and ensures that it has mechanisms allowing it to track its entire global fleet.
The affair reveals the deepening tension between Washington and the rest of the world. ASML has become one of the most critical industrial assets in global technology competition, a real irritant for the US government. To the point that Secretary of State for Commerce Howard Lutnick, according to Bloomberg News, told ASML managers that the American administration feared that “one of the most advanced machines” of the company could have ended up in China despite export restrictions.
Because behind his suspicions lies a much more fundamental question: who really controls the technologies that determine the future of artificial intelligence?
The most strategic monopoly in the digital economy
Although its first capitalization since June 5, ASML’s influence is not measured by its market capitalization or its turnover, but by the absence of an alternative, at least in the short term.
The Dutch company is today the only company in the world capable of large-scale production of extreme ultraviolet lithography systems, the famous EUV machines. This equipment makes it possible to engrave the most advanced components in the electronics industry.
Each EUV system represents several hundred thousand parts, mobilizes supply chains spread across several continents and requires years of assembly. Their price now exceeds 350 million euros for the most recent versions.
Without these machines, it is virtually impossible to produce the most advanced processors from TSMC, GPUs from NVIDIA, or chips designed by Apple. In other words, behind every artificial intelligence model, every high-end smartphone or every modern cloud infrastructure is indirectly technology controlled by ASML.
A situation without equivalent in contemporary industry, where ASML occupies a more dominant position in advanced lithography than was Intel in microprocessors at its peak or Microsoft in operating systems in the 1990s.
Washington no longer seeks to control fleas
Since 2019, the American strategy towards China has gone through several phases, the first consisted of limiting Beijing’s access to the most advanced semiconductors, the second targeted companies capable of designing these chips, notably Huawei, and the third, it attacked AI accelerators from NVIDIA, AMD or Intel.
A fourth stage is now underway with control of the means of production themselves at stake.
American officials gradually understood that as long as China could access the tools to manufacture its own components, it remained on a trajectory of technological catch-up.
The logic of control has therefore moved upstream of the value chain, and consequently the machine which makes it possible to manufacture it.
The Washington problem: ASML is not American
The US administration has considerable leverage over the global semiconductor industry.
The leading electronic design software is American, the dominant computing architectures are American, the major cloud providers are American, the most advanced GPUs are American, but ASML is not.
The company is legally dependent on the Dutch authorities, its export licenses are issued in The Hague and its industrial interests do not always coincide with those of Washington.
The American strategy of technological restriction is based on the alignment of several allied jurisdictions. However, the more critical a technology becomes, the more difficult it becomes for American officials to accept dependence on foreign actors.
China has become too important to ignore
One of the difficulties facing American authorities is that China remains a major market for ASML. The group still plans to generate around 20% of its turnover there in 2026.
For Washington, this economic dependence constitutes a potential vulnerability. From the American perspective, every dollar generated in China indirectly contributes to strengthening an industrial ecosystem that the United States seeks precisely to slow down.
From a European perspective, the situation appears different. The continent’s industrialists often consider that their role consists of applying the regulations in force, not actively participating in a geopolitical strategy defined in Washington.
And this divergent reading explains part of the current tensions.
The real problem: China is progressing despite everything
Another element deserves attention.
Even American officials do not seem to have public evidence demonstrating the effective presence of an EUV system in China, the progress of Chinese manufacturers is very real.
Huawei continues to improve its production capacities, Chinese foundries are gradually increasing their output, and local players are developing alternatives to Western equipment.
This situation leads to an uncomfortable conclusion. However, we cannot rule out that the problem is not ASML, but that China continues to progress despite any embargo.
ASML, first test of a new extraterritoriality
The issue goes well beyond semiconductors; what is happening today around ASML could foreshadow the way in which Washington intends to manage critical technologies over the next decade.
If Washington’s questions are addressed today to a private company, it is difficult for the EU not to interfere in the conversation. But is she aware of what ASML represents for Europe and which will carry within it, a voice which will have to combine great firmness and obvious diplomacy in the face of Washington.
